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BOUNDS AND CONSTRUCTIONS FOR 3-SEPARABLE CODES WITH
LENGTH 3
MINQUAN CHENG, JING JIANG, HAIYAN LI, YING MIAO, AND XIAOHU TANG
Abstract. Separable codes were introduced to provide protection against illegal redistri-
bution of copyrighted multimedia material. Let C be a code of length n over an alphabet
of q letters. The descendant code desc(C0) of C0 = {c1, c2, . . . , ct} ⊆ C is defined to be the
set of words x = (x1, x2, . . . , xn)
T such that xi ∈ {c1,i, c2,i, . . . , ct,i} for all i = 1, . . . , n,
where cj = (cj,1, cj,2, . . . , cj,n)
T . C is a t-separable code if for any two distinct C1, C2 ⊆ C
with |C1| ≤ t, |C2| ≤ t, we always have desc(C1) 6= desc(C2). Let M(t, n, q) denote the max-
imal possible size of such a separable code. In this paper, an upper bound on M(3, 3, q)
is derived by considering an optimization problem related to a partial Latin square, and
then two constructions for 3-SC(3,M, q)s are provided by means of perfect hash families
and Steiner triple systems.
1. Introduction
Separable codes can be used to construct multimedia fingerprinting codes which can
effectively trace and even identify the sources of pirate copies of copyrighted multimedia
data, see, e.g., [8, 13]. They are of interest in combinatorics and can be also used to study
the classic digital fingerprinting codes such as identifiable parent property (IPP) codes
[9, 10], frameproof codes (FPCs) [2, 5], perfect hash families (PHFs) [11] and so on. Cheng
and Miao [8] pointed out that IPP codes, FPCs, PHFs and some other structures in digital
fingerprinting are in fact examples of separable codes with additional properties.
Let n,M and q be positive integers, and Q be an alphabet with |Q| = q. A set C =
{c1, c2, . . . , cM} ⊆ Qn is called an (n,M, q) code and each ci is called a codeword. Without
loss of generality, we may assume Q = {0, 1, . . . , q − 1}. When Q = {0, 1}, we also use the
word “binary”. Given an (n,M, q) code, its incidence matrix is the n×M matrix on Q in
which the columns are the M codewords in C. We do not distinguish an (n,M, q) code and
its incidence matrix unless otherwise stated.
For any subset of codewords C0 ⊆ C, we define the set of ith coordinates of C0 as
C0(i) = {ci ∈ Q | c = (c1, c2, . . . , cn)T ∈ C0}, 1 ≤ i ≤ n,
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and the descendant code of C0 as
desc(C0) = {x = (x1, x2, . . . , xn)T ∈ Qn | xi ∈ C0(i), 1 ≤ i ≤ n},
that is,
desc(C0) = C0(1) × C0(2)× · · · × C0(n).
Definition 1.1. Let C be an (n,M, q) code and t ≥ 2 be an integer.
(1) C is a t-separable code, or t-SC(n,M, q), if for any C1, C2 ⊆ C such that |C1| = |C2| = t
and C1 6= C2, we have desc(C1) 6= desc(C2), that is, there is at least one coordinate i,
1 ≤ i ≤ n, such that C1(i) 6= C2(i).
(2) C is a t-separable code, or t-SC(n,M, q), if for any C1, C2 ⊆ C such that |C1| ≤ t,
|C2| ≤ t and C1 6= C2, we have desc(C1) 6= desc(C2), that is, there is at least one
coordinate i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, such that C1(i) 6= C2(i).
(3) C is a t-frameproof code, or t-FPC(n,M, q), if for any C′ ⊆ C such that |C′| ≤ t, we
have that desc(C′)⋂ C = C′, that is, for any c = (c1, . . . , cn)T ∈ C \ C′, there is at
least one coordinate i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, such that ci 6∈ C′(i).
Cheng et al. [7, 8] established the following relationships between frameproof codes and
separable codes.
Lemma 1.2. ([8]) A t-FPC(n,M, q) is also a t-SC(n,M, q).
Theorem 1.3. ([7]) An (n,M, q) code C is a t-SC(n,M, q) if and only if C is a (t − 1)-
FPC(n,M, q) and a t-SC(n,M, q).
Since the parameter M of a t-SC(n,M, q) corresponds to the number of fingerprints
assigned to authorized users who purchased the right to access the copyrighted multimedia
data, we should try to construct separable codes with M as large as possible, given length
n. Let M(t, n, q) = max{M | there exists a t-SC(n,M, q)}. A t-SC(n,M, q) is said to be
optimal ifM =M(t, n, q). Similarly, a t-FPC(n,M, q) is optimal ifM is the largest possible
value given n, q and t. From the relationship above, Cheng et al. obtained the following
upper bound on M(t, n, q).
Theorem 1.4. ([7]) Let n, q and t be positive integers such that t ≥ 3 and n ≥ 2, and let
r ∈ {0, 1, . . . , t− 2} be the remainder of n on division by t− 1. If M(t, n, q) > q, then
M(t, n, q) ≤ max{q⌈n/(t−1)⌉, r(q⌈n/(t−1)⌉ − 1) + (t− 1− r)(q⌊n/(t−1)⌋ − 1)}.
Bazrafshan and Trung showed the following results.
Lemma 1.5. ([1]) For any positive integers t and q ≥ 2, the following code is an optimal
t-FPC(n, n(q − 1), q) when 2 ≤ n ≤ t.

1 2 . . . q − 1 0 0 . . . 0 . . . 0 0 . . . 0
0 0 . . . 0 1 2 . . . q − 1 . . . 0 0 . . . 0
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 . . . 0 0 0 . . . 0 . . . 1 2 . . . q − 1


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Lemma 1.6. ([1]) For a t-FPC(n,M, q) with n = 1 + t we have
(i) M ≤ q2, if n ≤ q,
(ii) M ≤ nq, if n > q.
According to Theorem 1.3 and Lemmas 1.2, 1.5, 1.6, the following corollaries can be
obtained.
Corollary 1.7. For any positive integers t and q ≥ 2, there always exists an optimal
t-SC(n, n(q − 1), q) when 2 ≤ n < t.
Corollary 1.8. In a t-SC(n,M, q) with n = t we have
(i) M ≤ q2, if n ≤ q,
(ii) M ≤ nq, if n > q.
Using random choice with expurgation, Blackburn [4] showed the following result.
Theorem 1.9. ([4]) Let n and t be fixed integers such that n ≥ 2 and t ≥ 3. There exists
a positive constant κ, depending only on n and t, so that there is a q-ary t-separable code
of length n with at least κqn/(t−1) codewords for all sufficiently large integers q.
Corollary 1.10. There exists a positive constant κ, depending only on n and t, so that
M(t, n, q) ≥ κqn/(t−1) for all sufficiently large integers q.
Cheng and Miao [8] showed that long-length separable codes can be constructed by
concatenating short-length separable codes. This stimulates the investigation of separable
codes with short length n = 2, 3. When n = 2, 3, upper bounds on M(2, n, q) were derived,
and several infinite series of optimal 2-SC(n,M, q)s were constructed in [6, 7]. When t ≥ 3,
the structure of t-SCs becomes more complex so that little is known about t-SCs for t ≥ 3.
In this paper, we mainly study 3-SCs. When n = 2, by Corollary 1.7, we know that for
any integer q ≥ 2, there always exists an optimal 3-SC(2, 2(q − 1), q). When n = 3 and
q = 2, an exhaustive computer search shows that C = {(1, 0, 0)T , (0, 1, 0)T , (0, 0, 1)T } is an
optimal 3-SC(3, 3, 2). When q > 2, we have M(3, 3, q) ≤ q2 by Corollary 1.8. However,
this upper bound is not tight. In the following sections, we will first derive a new upper
bound M(3, 3, q) ≤ ⌊3q24 ⌋ by considering an optimization problem related to a partial Latin
square. Two constructions for 3-SC(3,M, q)s will be then provided by means of perfect
hash families and Steiner triple systems. The first one shows that 3-SC(3,M, q)s with
M = O(q3/2) codewords, the lower bound provided by Blackburn (Corollary 1.10) using a
probabilistic proof, can be constructed explicitly for all integers q. The second one shows
that 3-SC(3,M, q)s with M = O(q2) codewords do exist.
2. Forbidden configurations
In this section, we first show that a 3-separable code, C, cannot contain certain subcodes,
that is, there are certain forbidden configurations in C. Then we use these forbidden con-
figurations, together with the 2-frameproof code property, to give a necessary and sufficient
condition for a (3,M, q) code to be a 3-SC(3,M, q).
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For any (3,M, q) code C defined on Q, we define two shortened codes A(1)i and A(1,2)i,k for
i, k ∈ Q as
A
(1)
i = {(c2, c3) | (i, c2, c3)T ∈ C} and A(1,2)i,k = {c3 | (i, k, c3)T ∈ C},
respectively. Obviously, A
(1)
i ⊆ Q2 and A(1,2)i,k ⊆ Q hold for any i, k ∈ Q, and∑
i∈Q
|A(1)i | =
∑
i∈Q
∑
k∈Q
|A(1,2)i,k | =M.
Similarly, A
(2)
i and A
(3)
i for i ∈ Q can be defined. Cheng et al. [7] obtained the following
result.
Lemma 2.1. [7] If C is a t-SC(n,M, q), then |A(j)i
⋂
A
(j)
i′ | ≤ 1 holds for any distinct i, i′ ∈ Q
and j = 1, 2, . . . , n.
From the notions above and the definition of an FPC, the following Lemma 2.2 can be
obtained.
Lemma 2.2. A (3,M, q) code is a 2-FPC(3,M, q) if and only if |A(j)i
⋂
A
(j)
i′ | ≤ 1 holds for
any j ∈ {1, 2, 3} and distinct i, i′ ∈ Q, where if |A(j)i
⋂
A
(j)
i′ | = 1, then |A(j)i | = |A(j)i′ | = 1.
Proof: Let C be a (3,M, q) code. We first suppose that C is a 2-FPC(3,M, q). Ac-
cording to Lemma 1.2, C is a 2-SC(3,M, q). So for any j ∈ {1, 2, 3} and distinct i, i′ ∈ Q,
|A(j)i
⋂
A
(j)
i′ | ≤ 1 holds by Lemma 2.1. When |A(j)i
⋂
A
(j)
i′ | = 1, without loss of gener-
ality, we may assume that j = 1 and {a} = A(1)i
⋂
A
(1)
i′ . If there is another element
b ∈ A(1)i , then we have (i,a)T , (i,b)T , (i′,a)T ∈ C, {(i′,a)T , (i,b)T }
⋂{(i,a)T } = ∅, and
(i,a)T ∈ desc({(i′,a)T , (i,b)T })⋂ C. This contradicts the definition of a frameprood code.
So |A(1)i | = 1 holds. Similarly, |A(1)i′ | = 1 can be proved.
Conversely, if C is not a 2-FPC(3,M, q), then there exist three distinct codewords a =
(a1, a2, a3)
T , b = (b1, b2, b3)
T , c = (c1, c2, c3)
T ∈ C, such that c ∈ desc({a,b}). Since the
codeword length equals 3, there exists at least one codeword, say a, such that it contains
two same coordinates as c, say a2 = c2 and a3 = c3. Since c ∈ desc({a,b}), then b1 = c1.
That is, c = (b1, a2, a3)
T . Obviously, |A(1)a1
⋂
A
(1)
b1
| ≥ 1 and |A(1)b1 | ≥ 2, which contradict our
assumption. 
Now, let us turn our attention to 3-SC(3,M, q)s. For any 3-SC(3,M, q), C, it can be
checked that there is no subcode △1 ⊆ C described in (1).
△1 =

 a a b be f g e
c d c d

 , △2 =

 a a b bc d c d
e f g e

 , △3 =

 e f g ea a b b
c d c d

 . (1)
The reason is as follows. If C contains the configuration △1, then since C is also a 2-
FPC(3,M, q) by Theorem 1.3, we should have a 6= b, c 6= d and e 6∈ {f, g}. How-
ever, in this case, {(a, e, c)T , (a, f, d)T , (b, g, c)T } 6= {(a, f, d)T , (b, g, c)T , (b, e, d)T }, but
desc({(a, e, c)T , (a, f, d)T , (b, g, c)T }) = desc({(a, f, d)T , (b, g, c)T , (b, e, d)T }), a contradic-
tion to the definition of a 3-SC. We call such △1 a forbidden configuration of C. Given
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a subcode C′ ⊆ C, conjugates of C′ are subsets of Q3 defined by changing any two coordi-
nates of C′. Clearly, △1 and its conjugates in (1) are forbidden configurations of C.
It is easy to check that the following ∇ is also a forbidden configuration of C, where
|{ai, bi, ci}| = 3, i = 1, 2, 3.
∇ =

 a1 b1 c1 a1 b1 c1a2 b2 c2 b2 c2 a2
a3 b3 c3 c3 a3 b3

 (2)
Theorem 2.3. A (3,M, q) code C is a 3-SC(3,M, q) if and only if it satisfies the following
conditions:
(i) C is a 2-FPC(3,M, q);
(ii) Configurations in (1) and (2) are all the forbidden configurations of C.
The proof of Theorem 2.3 is included in Appendix.
3. An upper bound
As we said at the end of Section 1, when n = 3 and q > 2, we have an upper bound
M(3, 3, q) ≤ q2. In this section, we are going to derive a new upper boundM(3, 3, q) ≤ ⌊3q24 ⌋
by exploiting the two conditions in Theorem 2.3.
Given a 3-SC(3,M, q), C, defined on Q = {0, 1, . . . , q − 1}, the following q × q array can
be obtained, where each entry is a subset of Q.
A =


A(1,2)0,0 . . . A(1,2)0,q−1
A(1,2)1,0 . . . A(1,2)1,q−1
. . . . . . . . .
A(1,2)q−1,0 . . . A(1,2)q−1,q−1


By Theorem 2.3, C is also a 2-FPC(3,M, q). Then it can be easily checked that A has
the following properties.
(I) P1.1: If |A(1,2)i,j | ≥ 2, then A(1,2)i,j
⋂A(1,2)i′,j′ = ∅ holds for any (i′, j′) ∈ Q2 \ {(i, j)};
P1.2: If |A(1,2)i,j
⋂A(1,2)i,j′ | = 1 with j 6= j′, then A(1,2)i′,j = A(1,2)i′,j′ = ∅ holds for any i′ ∈ Q\{i};
P1.3: If |A(1,2)i,j
⋂A(1,2)i′,j | = 1 with i 6= i′, then A(1,2)i,j′ = A(1,2)i′,j′ = ∅ holds for any j′ ∈ Q\{j}.
Again by Theorem 2.3, configuration △2 is a forbidden configuration of C. Then it is
easily seen that A has the following property.
(II) P2: If |A(1,2)i,j
⋂A(1,2)i′,j′ | = 1 with i 6= i′, j 6= j′, then A(1,2)i′,j = ∅ or A(1,2)i,j′ = ∅ holds.
From array A, we can define a related array B = (bi,j) in the following way:
bi,j =


ai,j if A(1,2)i,j = {ai,j},
⋆ if 2 ≤ |A(1,2)i,j |,
× if A(1,2)i,j = ∅.
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Let µi = |{j | |A(1,2)i,j | ≥ 2, j ∈ Q}| be the number of sets A(1,2)i,j with |A(1,2)i,j | ≥ 2 in the ith
row of A, namely, the number of “⋆” in the ith row of B. Let ρi =
∑
j∈Q,2≤|A
(1,2)
i,j
|
|A(1,2)i,j |
be the sum of orders of A(1,2)i,j with |A(1,2)i,j | ≥ 2 in the ith row of A. Then according to P1.1,
we know that the sum of orders of A(1,2)i,j with |A(1,2)i,j | ≥ 2 in A is
∑
i∈Q
ρi = |
⋃
i,j∈Q
|A
(1,2)
i,j
|≥2
A(1,2)i,j | =
∑
i,j∈Q
|A
(1,2)
i,j
|≥2
|A(1,2)i,j |.
Let Di be the set of elements of Q occurring at least twice in the ith row of B. Let mi
be the sum of frequencies of elements in Di in the ith row of B, m(−i) =
∑
l∈Q\{i}ml and
m =
∑
l∈Qml. Let Bi be the set of elements of Q occurring exactly once in the ith row of
B. Let zi,j = |Bi
⋂
Bj |. Clearly, zi,j ≤ q.
Now we consider the total number of distinct elements of Q in the ith and jth rows of
B. The number of distinct elements of Q in any lth row of B is |Bl|+ |Dl|. The number of
distinct elements of Q in the ith and jth rows of B is at least |Bi| + |Bj | − |Bi ∩ Bj |, and
from the definition of ρl and property P1,1, is at most q −
∑
i∈Q ρi. So we have
|Bi|+ |Bj | − |Bi ∩Bj| ≤ q −
∑
l∈Q
ρl.
We also consider the number of entries in the ith and jth rows of B. Clearly, for the lth
row of B, m(−l) + µl +ml + |Bl| ≤ q, and for the ith and jth rows of B,
[|Bi|+ µi +m(−i) +mi] + [|Bj |+ µj +m(−j) +mj] + zi,j ≤ 2q
where the term “zi,j” is the number of additional “×” caused by the forbidden configuration
△2.
We are in a position to derive our new upper bound on M(3, 3, q).
Theorem 3.1. M(3, 3, q) ≤ ⌊3q24 ⌋ holds for q ≥ 4.
Proof: Let C be a 3-SC(3,M, q) defined on Q. Clearly, M = ∑i,l∈Q |A(1,2)i,l |, where∑
l∈Q |A(1,2)i,l | = ρi+ mi + |Bi|. So our goal is to solve the following optimization problem.

Maximize
∑
i∈Q(ρi +mi + |Bi|)
Subject to 2m+ µi + |Bi|+ µj + |Bj|+ zi,j ≤ 2q
|Bi|+ |Bj| − zi,j +
∑
l∈Q ρl ≤ q
i, j ∈ Q.
From the constraints above, we have
2m+ µi + µj + 2(|Bi|+ |Bj |) +
∑
l∈Q
ρl ≤ 3q.
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Summarizing the inequality above for all i 6= j, we have
2(q − 1)
∑
l∈Q
|Bl|+ (q − 1)
∑
l∈Q
µl + 2m
(
q
2
)
+
(
q
2
)∑
l∈Q
ρl ≤ 3q
(
q
2
)
.
When 2(q − 1) ≤ (q2), that is, q ≥ 4, we have
2(q − 1)M = 2(q − 1)
∑
l∈Q
(|Bl|+ml + ρl)
≤ 2(q − 1)
∑
l∈Q
(|Bl|+ml) +
(
q
2
)∑
l∈Q
ρl
≤ 3q
(
q
2
)
− (q − 1)
(∑
l∈Q
µl + (q − 2)m
)
≤ 3q
(
q
2
)
.
This implies M ≤ ⌊3q24 ⌋. 
This bound is sharp for some q ≥ 4. In fact, if we can find a 3-SC(3,M, q), C, on Q such
that every entry in its corresponding A is a singleton or empty set, no element of Q appears
in any row or column of A more than once, and the number of “×” in each row of B is q4 ,
then M = 34q
2. The following is such an example.
Example 3.2. When q = 4, M(3, 3, 4) = 3× 42/4 = 12. Then it can be checked that C4 is
an optimal 3-SC(3, 12, 4). We list it and its related array as follows.
C4 =

 0 0 0 1 1 1 2 2 2 3 3 30 1 2 0 2 3 0 1 3 1 2 3
0 1 2 1 3 2 3 2 0 3 0 1

 , B4 =


0 1 2 ×
1 × 3 2
3 2 × 0
× 3 0 1


4. Constructions
B4 in Example 3.2 can be regarded as a partial Latin square of order 4, which corresponds
to an optimal 3-SC(3, 12, 4). In this section, we use partial Latin squares to construct 3-
SC(3,M, q)s. The definition of a partial Latin square is given below.
Definition 4.1. A partial Latin square P of order q is a q × q array with entries chosen
from a q-set Q in such a way that each element of Q occurs at most once in each row and
at most once in each column of the array. If all the cells of the array are filled then the
partial Latin square is termed a Latin square.
For ease of exposition, a partial Latin square P will be represented by a set of ordered
triples {(i, j, Pij) | element Pij occurs in cell (i, j) of the array}.
Lemma 4.2. For any partial Latin square P, its associated code C = {c | c = (i, j, Pij)T |
(i, j;Pij) ∈ P} is a 2-FPC.
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Proof: Suppose C is not a 2-FPC. Then there exist C′ = {a,b} ⊆ C and c = (c1, c2, c3)T ∈
C\C′ such that c ∈ desc(C′). This implies that there exists a codeword, say b = (b1, b2, b3)T ∈
C′, such that there are at least two coordinates i, j ∈ {1, 2, 3} satisfying bi = ci and bj = cj .
If (i, j) = (1, 2), then {(c1, c2; c3), (c1, c2; b3)} ⊆ P, that is, cell (c1, c2) contains both c3 and
b3, a contradiction to the definition of a partial Latin square. Similarly, it is readily checked
that neither (i, j) = (1, 3) nor (2, 3) is possible. The proof is then completed. 
In the following subsections, we first construct partial Latin squares by means of perfect
hash families and Steiner triple systems, respectively, and then show that the associated
codes of these partial Latin squares do not contain the forbidden configurations (1) and (2).
According to Theorem 2.3, these associated codes are 3-SC(3,M, q)s.
4.1. Constructions via perfect hash families. Let f be a function from a set X to a
set Y . We say that f separates a subset T ⊆ X if f is injective when f is restricted to
T ; otherwise we say that f reduces T . Let M, q, t be integers such that M ≥ q ≥ t ≥ 2.
Suppose |X| = M and |Y | = q. A set F of functions from X to Y with |F| = n is an
(n;M, q, t)-perfect hash family if for all T ⊆ X with |T | = t, there exists at least one f ∈ F
such that f separates T . We use the notation PHF(n;M, q, t) for an (n;M, q, t)-perfect
hash family. A PHF(n;M, q, t) can be depicted as an n ×M array in which the columns
are labeled by the elements j ∈ X, the rows by the functions fi ∈ F , and the (i, j)-entry of
the array is the value fi(j). Thus, a PHF(n;M, q, t) is equivalent to an n ×M array with
entries from a set of q symbols such that every n × t subarray contains at least one row
having distinct symbols. A perfect hash family is optimal if M is the largest possible value
given n, q and t.
Given a PHF(n;M, q, t), F = {f1, f2, . . . , fn}, we can derive an associated code C in an
obvious way: associate each x ∈ X with the codeword (f1(x), f2(x), . . . , fn(x))T . Staddon
et al. [10] observed that the associated code of a PHF(n;M, q, t) is a (t− 1)-FPC(n,M, q).
However, we should note that the associated codes of a PHF(n;M, q, t) is not always a
t-SC(n,M, q). In fact, we can easily check that ∇ in (2), a forbidden configuration of
3-SC(3,M, q), is a PHF(3; 6, q, 3).
In this subsection, we will first show that a special optimal PHF(3; r3, r2, 3) in [3] is in fact
also a 3-SC(3, r3, r2). Based on this PHF(3; r3, r2, 3), we then propose a new construction
for a 3-SC(3, r3 + r5/2, r2) for any even square r.
Let r ≥ 2 be an integer, X = Z3r , and Y = Zr2 . Define functions f1, f2, f3 : X → Y by
f1((a, b, c)) = ar + b, f2((a, b, c)) = ar + c and f3((a, b, c)) = br + c
for all a, b, c ∈ Zr.
Theorem 4.3. ([3]) The functions f1, f2, and f3 defined above form an optimal PHF(3; r
3, r2, 3).
Let C1 = {(f1((a, b, c)), f2((a, b, c)), f3((a, b, c)))T | a, b, c ∈ Zr} be the associated code of
the above PHF. It is not difficult to check that the corresponding r2×r2 array of C1, in which
the rows are labeled by f1((a, b, c)), the columns by f2((a, b, c)), and (f1((a, b, c)), f2((a, b, c)))-
entry is f3((a, b, c)), is a partial Latin square. Then Lemma 4.2 shows that C1 is a 2-
FPC(3, r3, r2). In fact, we can say more about C1.
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Lemma 4.4. C1 is a 3-SC(3, r3, r2) for any integer r ≥ 2.
Proof: From Theorem 2.3, it is sufficient to prove that forbidden configurations in (1)
and (2) cannot occur in C1. It is easy to check that the forbidden configurations in (1)
are also forbidden configurations of PHF(3; r3, r2, 3). Now, let us consider the forbidden
configuration in (2). Denote a 6-subset of C1 by C = (α1,α2, . . . ,α6), where αi = (air +
bi, air + ci, bir + ci)
T , 1 ≤ i ≤ 6. Assume C = ∇, then we have
a1r + b1 = a4r + b4 a2r + b2 = a5r + b5 a3r + b3 = a6r + b6
a1r + c1 = a6r + c6 a2r + c2 = a4r + c4 a3r + c3 = a5r + c5
b1r + c1 = b5r + c5 b2r + c2 = b6r + c6 b3r + c3 = b4r + c4
.
which imply a1 = a2, b1 = b2 and c1 = c2, a contradiction to the assumption. Then the
proof is completed. 
From Lemma 4.4, a lower bound can be obtained.
Corollary 4.5. ⌊√q⌋3 ≤M(3, 3, q) holds for q ≥ 4.
Now we illustrate Lemma 4.4 with a small example.
Example 4.6. (1) Let r = 4. Then according to Lemma 4.4, the associated code of B1
described below is a 3-SC(3, 64, 16).
B1 =


A
A
A
A

 , where A =


0 1 2 3
4 5 6 7
8 9 10 11
12 13 14 15


and other cells of B1 are filled with “×”.
(2) Replacing some “×”s in B1 by some elements of Y = Zr2 , we obtain the following
array B, which is still a partial Latin square. It can be checked that its associated code is
a 3-SC(3, 96, 16).
B =


A A1
A A2
A A1
A2 A

 , where A1 =


10 11
14 15
0 1
4 5

 , A2 =


8 9
12 13
2 3
6 7

 .
Inspired by Example 4.6, for any even square r = k2, we define other six functions as
follows:
g1(x, y, z, h) = xk + y + hr, g2(x, y, z, h) = xk + z + (h+ 1)r,
g(x, y) = r − (x+ 1)k + y, g3(x, y, z, h) = g(x, y)r + g(x, z),
g′2(x, y, z, h) = g(x, z) + (h+ 1)r, g
′
3(x, y, z, h) = g(x, y)r + xk + z,
where all the operations in the above functions are taken in Zr2 . Using these functions, we
further define the following codes.
C2 = {(g1(x, y, z, h), g2(x, y, z, h), g3(x, y, z, h))T | x, y, z ∈ Zk, h ∈ Zr, h ≡ 0 mod 2},
C3 = {(g1(x, y, z, h), g′2(x, y, z, h), g′3(x, y, z, h))T | x, y, z ∈ Zk, h ∈ Zr, h ≡ 1 mod 2}.
Similar to Lemma 4.4, we have
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Lemma 4.7. For any even square r = k2, C2 is a 3-SC(3, kr2/2, r2), and so is C3.
Proof: Let us first consider C2. Let X = Z3k × Zr and Y = Zr2 . We show that
F ′ = {g1, g2, g3} forms a PHF(3; kr2/2, r2, 3). It is easy to check that an element v ∈ X
is uniquely determined by any two of three images g1(v), g2(v) and g3(v), therefore every
2-subset of X is reduced by at most one of g1, g2 and g3. Suppose, for a contradiction,
that {v1 = (x1, y1, z1, h1),v2 = (x2, y2, z2, h2),v3 = (x3, y3, z3, h3)} ⊆ X is a 3-set that is
reduced by all of the functions g1, g2 and g3. Since every 2-set is reduced by at most one of
g1, g2 and g3 and since every function gi must reduce some 2-subset of {v1,v2,v3}, we may
assume without loss of generality that g1(v1) = g1(v2), g2(v1) = g2(v3) and g3(v2) = g3(v3).
This implies that x1 = x2, y1 = y2, z1 = z2 and h1 = h2, a contradiction to the assumption.
So F ′ is a 3-PHF(3; kr2/2, r2, 3).
Clearly, C2 is the associated code of the perfect hash family F ′. Similar to the proof of
Lemma 4.4, we need only consider the forbidden configuration in (2). Denote a 6-subset of
C2 by C = (β1,β2, . . . ,β6), where βi = (g1(xi, yi, zi, hi), g2(xi, yi, zi, hi), g3(xi, yi, zi, hi))T ,
1 ≤ i ≤ 6. Assume C = ∇, then we have
x1k + y1 + h1r = x4k + y4 + h4r, x2k + y2 + h2r = x5k + y5 + h5r,
x3k + y3 + h3r = x6k + y6 + h6r, x1k + z1 + (h1 + 1)r = x6k + z6 + (h6 + 1)r,
x2k + z2 + (h2 + 1)r = x4k + z4 + (h4 + 1)r, x3k + z3 + (h3 + 1)r = x5k + z5 + (h5 + 1)r,
r[r − (x1 + 1)k + y1] + r − (x1 + 1)k + z1 = r[r − (x5 + 1)k + y5] + r − (x5 + 1)k + z5,
r[r − (x2 + 1)k + y2] + r − (x2 + 1)k + z2 = r[r − (x6 + 1)k + y6] + r − (x6 + 1)k + z6,
r[r − (x3 + 1)k + y3] + r − (x3 + 1)k + z3 = r[r − (x4 + 1)k + y4] + r − (x4 + 1)k + z4.
That is, x3 = x6, y3 = y6, z3 = z6 and h3 = h6, a contradiction to the assumption. By
Theorem 2.3, we know that C2 is a 3-SC(3, kr2/2, r2).
In a similar fashion, we can prove that C3 is also a 3-SC(3, kr2/2, r2). The proof is then
completed. 
As a matter of fact, A1 in Example 4.6 corresponds to C2 with k = 2, while A2 corresponds
to C3 with k = 2.
From the constructions of Ci, i = 1, 2, 3, it can be easily checked that the following
assertions hold
Corollary 4.8. (i) Ci ∩ Cj = ∅ for any distinct integers i, j ∈ {1, 2, 3};
(ii) The related array of C = C1 ∪ C2 ∪ C3 is a partial Latin square;
(iii) For any (a, b, c)T ∈ C2 and (d, e, f)T ∈ C3, we have a 6= d, b 6= e and c 6= f .
From Corollary 4.8, we have the following result.
Theorem 4.9. Let r = k2, where k is an even positive integer. Then C = C1 ∪ C2 ∪ C3 is a
3-SC(3, r3 + kr2, r2).
Proof: According to Corollary 4.8 and Lemma 4.2, the related array of C is a partial
Latin square, and C is a 2-FPC. Let
αi = (air + bi, air + ci, bir + ci)
T ∈ C1,
βi = (g1(xi, yi, zi, hi), g2(xi, yi, zi, hi), g3(xi, yi, zi, hi))
T ∈ C2
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γi = (g1(xi, yi, zi, hi), g
′
2(xi, yi, zi, hi), g
′
3(xi, yi, zi, hi))
T ∈ C3,
where 1 ≤ i ≤ 6. From Theorem 2.3, to prove that C is a 3-SC, we only need consider the
forbidden configurations in (1) and (2).
(I) Assume that △1 = (c1, c2, c3, c4) occurs in C, where ci ∈ Cki and ki ∈ {1, 2, 3},
i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}. Let us consider the 4-tuple vector (k1, k2, k3, k4).
(1) Suppose that (k1, k2, k3, k4) ∈ K1 = {(k, k, k, k) | k ∈ {1, 2, 3}}. This implies
that the codewords c1, c2, c3, c4 are all in the same subcode Ck, k ∈ {1, 2, 3},
a contradiction to the fact that Ck is a 3-SC.
(2) Suppose that (k1, k2, k3, k4) ∈ K2, where K2 = {(2, 3, k3, k4), (2, k2, 3, k4),
(2, k2, k3, 3), (k1, 2, k3, 3), (k1, k2, 2, 3), (3, 2, k3, k4), (3, k2, 2, k4), (3, k2, k3, 2),
(k1, 3, k3, 2), (k1, k2, 3, 2) | k1, k2, k3, k4 ∈ {1, 2, 3}}. This contradicts the state-
ment (iii) of Corollary 4.8.
(3) Suppose that (k1, k2, k3, k4) ∈ K3 = {1, 2, 3}4 \ (K1 ∪K2). It is easy to check
that none of the above cases equals △1. We take (k1, k2, k3, k4) = (1, 1, 1, 2) as
an example. Suppose that △1 = (α1, α2, α3, β4). We have
a1r + b1 = a2r + b2, a1r + c1 = x4k + z4 + (h4 + 1)r, b1r + c1 = b3r + c3,
b2r+ c2 = [r− (x4+1)k+ y4]r+ [r− (x4+1)k+ z4], a3r+ b3 = x4k+ y4+h4r.
That is, x4k+ y4 = b3 = b1 = b2 = r− (x4+1)k+ y4. This implies 2x4+1 = k,
a contradiction to the fact that k is even.
According to (1)-(3) above, we know that △1 does not occur in C. Similarly, we can
prove that △2 and △3 do not occur in C.
(II) Assume that ∇ = (c1, c2, c3, c4, c5, c6) occurs in C, where ci ∈ Cki and ki ∈ {1, 2, 3},
i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}. Let us consider the 6-tuple vector (k1, k2, k3, k4, k5, k6).
(1) Suppose that (k1, k2, k3, k4, k5, k6) ∈ K1 = {(k, k, k, k, k, k) | k ∈ {1, 2, 3}}.
This implies that the codewords c1, c2, c3, c4, c5, c6 are all in the same subcode
Ck, k ∈ {1, 2, 3}, a contradiction to the fact that Ck is a 3-SC.
(2) Suppose that (k1, k2, k3, k4, k5, k6) ∈ K2, where K2 equals
{(2, k2, k3, 3, k5, k6), (2, k2, k3, k4, 3, k6), (2, k2, k3, k4, k5, 3), (3, k2 , k3, 2, k5, k6),
(3, k2, k3, k4, 2, k6), (3, k2, k3, k4, k5, 2), (k1, 2, k3, 3, k5, k6), (k1, 2, k3, k4, 3, k6),
(k1, 2, k3, k4, k5, 3), (k1, 3, k3, 2, k5, k6), (k1, 3, k3, k4, 2, k6), (k1, 3, k3, k4, k5, 2),
(k1, k2, 2, 3, k5, k6), (k1, k2, 2, k4, 3, k6), (k1, k2, 2, k4, k5, 3), (k1, k2, 3, 2, k5, k6),
(k1, k2, 3, k4, 2, k6), (k1, k2, 3, k4, k5, 2) | k1, k2, k3, k4, k5, k6 ∈ {1, 2, 3}}.
This contradicts the statement (iii) of Corollary 4.8.
(3) Suppose that (k1, k2, k3, k4, k5, k6) ∈ K3 = {1, 2, 3}6 \ (K1 ∪ K2). It is easy
to check that none of the above cases equals ∇. We take (1, 1, 1, 1, 2, 3) as an
example. Let ∇ = (α1,α2,α3,α4,β5,γ6). We have
a1r + b1 = a4r + b4,
a1r + c1 = r − (x6 + 1)k + z6 + (h6 + 1)r,
b1r + c1 = [r − (x5 + 1)k + y5]r + [r − (x5 + 1)k + z5],
a2r + b2 = x5k + y5 + h5r,
a2r + c2 = a4r + c4,
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b3r + c3 = [r − (x6 + 1)k + y6]r + x6k + z6,
a3r + b3 = x6k + y6 + h6r,
a3r + c3 = x5k + z5 + (h5 + 1)r,
b3r + c3 = b4r + c4.
Then h6 ≡ h6 + 2 mod r, a contradiction to the fact r ≥ 4.
According to (1)-(3) above, we know that ∇ does not occur in C.
From the discussion above, we know that C is a 3-SC, and |C| = |C1 ∪ C2 ∪ C3| = |C1| +
|C2|+ |C3| = r2(k + r). The proof is then completed. 
4.2. Constructions via Steiner triple systems. In this subsection, some 3-SC(3,M, q)s
are constructed by means of Steiner triple systems, which are first used to construct partial
Latin squares. Let us see its definition first.
Definition 4.10. Let v be a positive integer. A Steiner triple system (STS(v) in short) is
a set system (V,B) where V is a set of v elements and B is a set of 3-subsets of V called
blocks such that every pair of distinct elements of V occurs in exactly one block of B.
It is well-known that Steiner triple systems can be constructed from (v, 3, 1)-difference
families. Let F be a family of 3-subsets of an additive group G with order v. F is called
a difference family (briefly denoted (v, 3, 1)-DF) if any nonzero element of G can be repre-
sented in a unique way as a difference of two elements lying in some member of F . Then the
set system (G,B) is a Steiner triple system of order v, where B = {B + g | B ∈ F , g ∈ G}.
Lemma 4.11. ([14]) Let q = 6t+ 1 be a prime power, ε be a primitive element in Fq, and
ξ = ε2t be a primitive 3rd root of unity in Fq. Then F = {{1, ξ, ξ2}εi | 0 ≤ i ≤ t− 1} is a
(v, 3, 1)-DF.
Given an STS(v) (V,B), we can define its corresponding partial Latin square P to be
the v × v-array with entry k in cell (i, j) if and only if {i, j, k} ∈ B, that is, we can derive
six entries (x, y; z), (x, z; y), (y, x; z), (y, z;x), (z, y;x) and (z, x; y) in P from each triple
{x, y, z} ∈ B.
Given a set S ⊆ {0, 1, . . . , t−1}, let D = {(1, ξ, ξ2)T εi | i ∈ S} and C = {D+ g | g ∈ Fq}.
Clearly, the related array of C is a partial Latin square with q|S| non-empty cells. From
Lemma 4.2, we know that C is a 2-FPC(3, q|S|, q). Now, let us consider the forbidden
configurations in (1) and (2).
(I) Without loss of generality, we may assume
△1 =

 ε
x εy + k1 ε
z + k2 ε
w + k3
εxξ εyξ + k1 ε
zξ + k2 ε
wξ + k3
εxξ2 εyξ2 + k1 ε
zξ2 + k2 ε
wξ2 + k3

 ,
where x, y, z, w ∈ S and k1, k2, k3 ∈ Fq. Then we have

εx = εy + k1
εz + k2 = ε
w + k3
εxξ = εwξ + k3
εxξ2 = εzξ2 + k2
εyξ2 + k1 = ε
wξ2 + k3
⇐⇒


k1 = ε
x − εy
εz + εxξ2 − εzξ2 = εw + εxξ − εwξ
k3 = ε
xξ − εwξ
k2 = ε
xξ2 − εzξ2
εyξ2 + εx − εy = εwξ2 + εxξ − εwξ
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This means
εw + εxξ + εzξ2 = 0 and εx + εwξ + εyξ2 = 0,
with |{x, y, z, w}| = 4. In fact,
(1) x 6= y, z, w always holds. If x = y, we have k1 = εx − εy = 0. This implies
that the first codeword equals the second codeword of △1, a contradiction to
the assumption. Similarly, from k2 = ε
xξ2 − εzξ2 and k3 = εxξ − εwξ, we have
x 6= z, w.
(2) y 6= z, w always holds. If y = z, we have x = w from εw + εxξ + εzξ2 = 0 and
εx + εwξ + εyξ2 = 0. This is a contradiction to the fact x 6= w. Similarly, from
εx + εwξ + εyξ2 = 0, we have y 6= w.
(3) z 6= w always holds. If z = w, from εw + εxξ + εzξ2 = 0, we have x = z, a
contradiction to the fact x 6= z.
The converse can be also proved to be true.
From the discussion above, we know that △1 occurs in C if and only if there exists
a solution to the following system of equations.

εw + εxξ + εzξ2 = 0
εx + εwξ + εyξ2 = 0
|{x, y, z, w}| = 4
, where x, y, z, w ∈ S. (3)
Similarly, we can check that any of △2, △3 occurs in C if and only if there exists
a solution to the above system of equations.
(II) Without loss of generality, we may assume
∇ =

 ε
x εy + k1 ε
z + k2 ε
u + k3 ε
v + k4 ε
w + k5
εxξ εyξ + k1 ε
zξ + k2 ε
uξ + k3 ε
vξ + k4 ε
wξ + k5
εxξ2 εyξ2 + k1 ε
zξ2 + k2 ε
uξ2 + k3 ε
vξ2 + k4 ε
wξ2 + k5

 ,
where x, y, z, u, v, w ∈ S and k1, k2, k3, k4, k5 ∈ Fq. Then we have

εx = εu + k3
εy + k1 = ε
v + k4
εz + k2 = ε
w + k5
εxξ = εwξ + k5
εyξ + k1 = ε
uξ + k3
εzξ + k2 = ε
vξ + k4
εxξ2 = εvξ2 + k4
εyξ2 + k1 = ε
wξ2 + k5
εzξ2 + k2 = ε
uξ2 + k3
⇐⇒


k3 = ε
x − εu
k1 = ε
v + εxξ2 − εvξ2 − εy
k2 = ε
w + εxξ − εwξ − εz
k5 = ε
xξ − εwξ
k1 = ε
uξ + εx − εu − εyξ
k2 = ε
vξ + εxξ2 − εvξ2 − εzξ
k4 = ε
xξ2 − εvξ2
k1 = ε
wξ2 + εxξ − εwξ − εyξ2
k2 = ε
uξ2 + εx − εu − εzξ2
.
This means
εx + εyξ2 + εzξ = 0, εu + εvξ + εwξ2 = 0 and εxξ + εu = εz + εwξ,
where 

x 6∈ {u, v, w} and |{u, v, w}| = 3 if x = y = z;
u 6∈ {x, y, z} and |{x, y, z}| = 3 if u = v = w;
|{x, y, z, u, v, w}| = 6 otherwise.
(4)
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From the discussion above, we have
(1) {x, y, z} ∩ {u, v, w} = ∅ always holds.
• x 6∈ {u, v, w} always holds. If x = u, we have k3 = εx−εu = 0. This implies
that the first codeword of ∇ equals the forth codeword of ∇, a contradiction to
the assumption. Similarly, from k5 = ε
xξ − εwξ and k4 = εxξ2 − εvξ2, we can
prove that x 6= w, v always holds.
• y 6∈ {u, v, w} always holds. If y = u, we have k1 = k3 from εyξ + k1 =
εuξ+k3. This implies that the second codeword of ∇ equals the forth codeword
of ∇, a contradiction to the assumption. Similarly, from εy + k1 = εv + k4 and
εyξ2 + k1 = ε
wξ2 + k5, we have y 6= v,w.
• z 6∈ {u, v, w} always holds. If z = u, we have k2 = k3 from εzξ2 + k2 =
εuξ2+k3. This implies that the third codeword of ∇ equals the forth codeword
of ∇, a contradiction to the assumption. Similarly, from εz + k2 = εw + k5 and
εzξ + k2 = ε
vξ + k4, we have z 6= w, v.
(2) If |{x, y, z}| < 3 (or |{u, v, w}| < 3), then |{x, y, z}| = 1 (or |{u, v, w}| = 1)
always holds. Without loss of generality, we may assume x = y. Then we have
x = y = z from εx + εyξ2 + εzξ = 0. Similarly, we have that if |{u, v, w}| < 3,
then |{u, v, w}| = 1 always holds from εu + εvξ + εwξ2 = 0.
(3) If x = y = z (or u = v = w), then |{u, v, w}| = 3 (or |{x, y, z}| = 3) always
holds. If x = y = z and u = v = w, we have εx = εu from εxξ + εu = εz + εwξ.
This is a contradiction to the fact x 6= u.
The converse can be also proved to be true.
Summarizing the discussion above, we know that ∇ occurs in C if and only if
there exists a solution to the following system of equations.


εx + εyξ2 + εzξ = 0
εu + εvξ + εwξ2 = 0
εxξ + εu = εz + εwξ
, where


x 6∈ {u, v, w} and |{u, v, w}| = 3 if x = y = z;
u 6∈ {x, y, z} and |{x, y, z}| = 3 if u = v = w;
|{x, y, z, u, v, w}| = 6 otherwise.
(5)
Therefore we have the following result.
Theorem 4.12. C is a 3-SC(3, q|S|, q) if and only if each solution to (3) and (5) does not
belong to S.
With the aid of a computer, by applying Theorem 4.12, we obtain the following results
for small q.
Corollary 4.13. (1) There exists a 3-SC(3, q(q−1)6 , q), when q = 73, 79, 103, 127, 139.
(2) There exists a 3-SC(3, ⌊ q(q−1)9 ⌋, q), when q = 109, 121, 157, 169, 199, 229, 313.
(3) There exists a 3-SC(3, ⌊ q(q−1)12 ⌋, q), when q = 151, 157, 163, 193, 211, 223, 241, 271,
277, 283, 307, 337, 349, 367, 409, 433, 499, 523, 547, 571, 577, 601, 727, 739, 811,
859.
(4) There exists a 3-SC(3, ⌊ q(q−1)18 ⌋, q), when q = 181, 313, 331, 343, 373, 397, 421, 439,
457, 499, 529, 541, 607, 613, 619, 625, 673, 691, 733, 751, 757, 787, 823, 841, 877,
907, 919, 937, 961, 967, 991, 997.
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Proof: The results are obtained by letting S = {0, 1, . . . , t − 1}, {i | i 6≡ 0 mod 3, 0 ≤
i < t}, {i | i ≡ 0 mod 2, 0 ≤ i < t}, {i | i ≡ 0 mod 3, 0 ≤ i < t}, respectively. 
5. Summary
In this paper, a new upper bound M(3, 3, q) ≤ ⌊3q24 ⌋ was derived by considering an
optimization problem related to a partial Latin square. Taking advantage of perfect hash
families, we constructed 3-SC(3, r3, r2)s for all positive integers r. Consequently, a lower
boundM(3, 3, q) ≥ ⌊√q⌋3 was obtained, and for every even integer k, a 3-SC(3, r3+kr2, r2)
was constructed where r = k2. Finally, the constructions of 3-SC(3,M, q) from Steiner triple
systems were also discussed.
Appendix: Proof of Theorem 2.3
The necessity is clear from Theorem 1.3 and the discussion in Section 2. We consider
its sufficiency. From the relationship between a separable code and a frameproof code in
Theorem 1.3, it is sufficient to prove that for any distinct A,B ⊆ C with |A| = |B| = 3, we
have desc(A) 6= desc(B) except that A⋃B equals one of the forbidden configurations in (1)
and (2).
Let A = {a = (a1, a2, a3)T , b = (b1, b2, b3)T , c = (c1, c2, c3)T } ⊆ C and B = {d =
(d1, d2, d3)
T , e = (e1, e2, e3)
T , f = (f1, f2, f3)
T } ⊆ C. Suppose that desc(A) = desc(B),
A 6= B and |A| = |B| = 3. Then we have {a1, b1, c1} = {d1, e1, f1}, {a2, b2, c2} = {d2, e2, f2}
and {a3, b3, c3} = {d3, e3, f3} by the definition of a separable code. There are three cases to
be considered:
(I) |A⋂B| = 2. Without loss of generality, we may assume that b = e and c = f , that is,
A = {a,b, c}, B = {b, c,d}. We list them as follows.
 a1 b1 c1 d1a2 b2 c2 d2
a3 b3 c3 d3

 (6)
Since C is a 2-FPC, the following statements hold.
➣ d 6∈ desc({a,b}) holds because d 6∈ {a,b}. Without loss of generality, we may
assume that d1 6∈ {a1, b1}, then c1 = d1 and a1 = b1 always hold since {a1, b1, c1} =
{b1, c1, d1}. Then (6) can be written as follows.
 a1 a1 c1 c1a2 b2 c2 d2
a3 b3 c3 d3

 (7)
➣ d 6∈ desc({b, c}) holds because d 6∈ {b, c}. Without loss of generality, we may
assume that d2 6∈ {b2, c2}, then a2 = d2 always holds since {a2, b2, c2} = {b2, c2, d2}.
Then (7) can be written as follows.
 a1 a1 c1 c1a2 b2 c2 a2
a3 b3 c3 d3

 (8)
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➣ d 6∈ desc({a, c}) holds because d 6∈ {a, c}. Then we must have d3 6∈ {a3, c3}, which
implies b3 = d3 and a3 = c3 since {a3, b3, c3} = {b3, c3, d3}. Then (8) can be written as
follows. 
 a1 a1 c1 c1a2 b2 c2 a2
a3 b3 a3 b3

 (9)
Obviously, (9) equals △1 in (1), which is a forbidden configuration in C.
(II) |A⋂B| = 1. Without loss of generality, we may assume that c = f , that is, A =
{a,b, c}, B = {c,d, e}. We list them as follows.

 a1 b1 c1 d1 e1a2 b2 c2 d2 e2
a3 b3 c3 d3 e3

 (10)
Since C is a 2-FPC, the following statements hold.
➣ d 6∈ desc({a,b}) holds because d 6∈ {a,b}. Without loss of generality, we may
assume that d1 6∈ {a1, b1}, then c1 = d1 and a1 = b1 = e1 always hold since {a1, b1, c1} =
{c1, d1, e1}. Then (10) can be written as follows.
 a1 a1 c1 c1 a1a2 b2 c2 d2 e2
a3 b3 c3 d3 e3

 (11)
➣ e 6∈ desc({a,b}) holds because e 6∈ {a,b}. Without loss of generality, we may assume
that e2 6∈ {a2, b2}, then c2 = e2 and a2 = b2 = d2 always hold since {a2, b2, c2} =
{c2, d2, e2}. Then (11) can be written as follows.
 a1 a1 c1 c1 a1a2 a2 c2 a2 c2
a3 b3 c3 d3 e3

 (12)
➣ d 6∈ desc({b, c}) holds because d 6∈ {b, c}. Then we must have d3 6∈ {b3, c3}, which
implies a3 = d3 since {a3, b3, c3} = {c3, d3, e3}. Then (12) can be written as follows.
 a1 a1 c1 c1 a1a2 a2 c2 a2 c2
a3 b3 c3 a3 e3


Obviousely, d ∈ desc({a, c}) holds. This contradicts the definition of a 2-FPC since
d 6∈ {a, c}.
So the case of |A⋂B| = 1 can never happen.
(III) |A⋂B| = 0. We list A and B as follows.
 a1 b1 c1 d1 e1 f1a2 b2 c2 d2 e2 f2
a3 b3 c3 d3 e3 f3

 (13)
Since C is a 2-FPC, the following statements hold.
BOUNDS AND CONSTRUCTIONS FOR 3-SEPARABLE CODES WITH LENGTH 3 17
➣ d 6∈ desc({a,b}) holds because d 6∈ {a,b}. Without loss of generality, we may
assume that d1 6∈ {a1, b1}, then c1 = d1 always holds since {a1, b1, c1} = {d1, e1, f1}.
Then (13) can be written as follows.

 a1 b1 c1 c1 e1 f1a2 b2 c2 d2 e2 f2
a3 b3 c3 d3 e3 f3

 (14)
➣ d 6∈ desc({a, c}) holds because d 6∈ {a, c}. Without loss of generality, we may
assume that d2 6∈ {a2, c2}, then b2 = d2 always holds since {a2, b2, c2} = {d2, e2, f2}.
Then (14) can be written as follows.

 a1 b1 c1 c1 e1 f1a2 b2 c2 b2 e2 f2
a3 b3 c3 d3 e3 f3

 (15)
➣ d 6∈ desc({b, c}) holds because d 6∈ {b, c}. Then we must have d3 6∈ {b3, c3}, which
implies a3 = d3 since {a3, b3, c3} = {d3, e3, f3}. Then (15) can be written as follows.
 a1 b1 c1 c1 e1 f1a2 b2 c2 b2 e2 f2
a3 b3 c3 a3 e3 f3


➣ e 6∈ desc({a,b}) holds because e 6∈ {a,b}. There must exist an index 1 ≤ i ≤ 3
such that ei 6∈ {ai, bi} holds.
(1.1) If e1 6∈ {a1, b1} holds, then c1 = e1 always holds since {a1, b1, c1} = {c1, e1, f1};
(1.2) If e2 6∈ {a2, b2} holds, then c2 = e2 always holds since {a2, b2, c2} = {b2, e2, f2};
(1.3) If e3 6∈ {a3, b3} holds, then c3 = e3 always holds since {a3, b3, c3} = {a3, e3, f3}.
➣ e 6∈ desc({a, c}) holds because e 6∈ {a, c}. There must exist an integer 1 ≤ i ≤ 3
such that ei 6∈ {ai, ci} holds.
(2.1) If e1 6∈ {a1, c1} holds, then b1 = e1 always holds since {a1, b1, c1} = {c1, e1, f1};
(2.2) If e2 6∈ {a2, c2} holds, then b2 = e2 always holds since {a2, b2, c2} = {b2, e2, f2};
(2.3) If e3 6∈ {a3, c3} holds, then b3 = e3 always holds since {a3, b3, c3} = {a3, e3, f3}.
➣ e 6∈ desc({b, c}) holds because e 6∈ {b, c}. There must exist an index 1 ≤ i ≤ 3 such
that ei 6∈ {bi, ci} holds.
(3.1) If e1 6∈ {b1, c1} holds, then a1 = e1 always holds since {a1, b1, c1} = {c1, e1, f1};
(3.2) If e2 6∈ {b2, c2} holds, then a2 = e2 always holds since {a2, b2, c2} = {b2, e2, f2};
(3.3) If e3 6∈ {b3, c3} holds, then a3 = e3 always holds since {a3, b3, c3} = {a3, e3, f3}.
➣ f 6∈ desc({a,b}) holds because f 6∈ {a,b}. There must exist an index 1 ≤ i ≤ 3 such
that fi 6∈ {ai, bi} holds.
(4.1) If f1 6∈ {a1, b1} holds, then c1 = f1 always holds since {a1, b1, c1} = {c1, e1, f1};
(4.2) If f2 6∈ {a2, b2} holds, then c2 = f2 always holds since {a2, b2, c2} = {b2, e2, f2};
(4.3) If f3 6∈ {a3, b3} holds, then c3 = f3 always holds since {a3, b3, c3} = {a3, e3, f3}.
➣ f 6∈ desc({a, c}) holds because f 6∈ {a, c}. There must exist an index 1 ≤ i ≤ 3 such
that fi 6∈ {ai, ci} holds.
(5.1) If f1 6∈ {a1, c1} holds, then b1 = f1 always holds since {a1, b1, c1} = {c1, e1, f1};
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(5.2) If f2 6∈ {a2, c2} holds, then b2 = f2 always holds since {a2, b2, c2} = {b2, e2, f2};
(5.3) If f3 6∈ {a3, c3} holds, then b3 = f3 always holds since {a3, b3, c3} = {a3, e3, f3}.
➣ f 6∈ desc({b, c}) holds because f 6∈ {b, c}. There must exist an index 1 ≤ i ≤ 3 such
that fi 6∈ {bi, ci} holds.
(6.1) If f1 6∈ {b1, c1} holds, then a1 = f1 always holds since {a1, b1, c1} = {c1, e1, f1};
(6.2) If f2 6∈ {b2, c2} holds, then a2 = f2 always holds since {a2, b2, c2} = {b2, e2, f2};
(6.3) If f3 6∈ {b3, c3} holds, then a3 = f3 always holds since {a3, b3, c3} = {a3, e3, f3}.
It is easy to check that for any i ∈ {1, 2, 3} or any i ∈ {4, 5, 6}, and for any j ∈ {1, 2, 3},
once (i.j) occurs, no (i′.j) can occur for any i′ ∈ {1, 2, 3} \ {i} or any i′ ∈ {4, 5, 6} \ {i},
respectively. So there are 3× 2× 1× 3× 2× 1 = 36 cases to be considered.
{(1.3), (2.2), (3.1), (4.2), (5.1), (6.3)}, {(1.1), (2.3), (3.2), (4.2), (5.1), (6.3)},
{(1.1), (2.3), (3.2), (4.2), (5.3), (6.1)}, {(1.1), (2.3), (3.2), (4.3), (5.1), (6.2)},
{(1.1), (2.3), (3.2), (4.3), (5.2), (6.1)}, {(1.2), (2.1), (3.3), (4.1), (5.3), (6.2)},
{(1.2), (2.1), (3.3), (4.2), (5.3), (6.1)}, {(1.2), (2.1), (3.3), (4.3), (5.1), (6.2)},
{(1.2), (2.1), (3.3), (4.3), (5.2), (6.1)}, {(1.2), (2.3), (3.1), (4.1), (5.3), (6.2)},
{(1.2), (2.3), (3.1), (4.2), (5.1), (6.3)}, {(1.2), (2.3), (3.1), (4.3), (5.2), (6.1)},
{(1.3), (2.1), (3.2), (4.1), (5.3), (6.2)}, {(1.3), (2.1), (3.2), (4.2), (5.1), (6.3)},
{(1.3), (2.1), (3.2), (4.3), (5.2), (6.1)}, {(1.3), (2.2), (3.1), (4.1), (5.3), (6.2)},
{(1.3), (2.2), (3.1), (4.2), (5.3), (6.1)}, {(1.3), (2.2), (3.1), (4.3), (5.1), (6.2)},
{(1.1), (2.2), (3.3), (4.1), (5.2), (6.3)}, {(1.1), (2.2), (3.3), (4.1), (5.3), (6.2)},
{(1.1), (2.2), (3.3), (4.2), (5.1), (6.3)}, {(1.1), (2.2), (3.3), (4.2), (5.3), (6.1)},
{(1.1), (2.2), (3.3), (4.3), (5.1), (6.2)}, {(1.1), (2.2), (3.3), (4.3), (5.2), (6.1)},
{(1.1), (2.3), (3.2), (4.1), (5.2), (6.3)}, {(1.1), (2.3), (3.2), (4.1), (5.3), (6.2)},
{(1.2), (2.1), (3.3), (4.1), (5.2), (6.3)}, {(1.2), (2.1), (3.3), (4.2), (5.1), (6.3)},
{(1.2), (2.3), (3.1), (4.1), (5.2), (6.3)}, {(1.2), (2.3), (3.1), (4.2), (5.3), (6.1)},
{(1.3), (2.1), (3.2), (4.1), (5.2), (6.3)}, {(1.3), (2.1), (3.2), (4.3), (5.1), (6.2)},
{(1.3), (2.2), (3.1), (4.1), (5.2), (6.3)}, {(1.3), (2.2), (3.1), (4.3), (5.2), (6.1)},
{(1.2), (2.3), (3.1), (4.3), (5.1), (6.2)}, {(1.3), (2.1), (3.2), (4.2), (5.3), (6.1)}.
It is readily checked that none of the first 18 subcases satisfies the condition (i) in this
theorem. For example, consider the subcase {(1.3), (2.2), (3.1), (4.2), (5.1), (6.3)}, that is,
(1.3) c3 = e3; (2.2) b2 = e2; (3.1) a1 = e1; (4.2) c2 = f2; (5.1) b1 = f1; (6.3) a3 = f3.
Then the corresponding subcode can be written as follows.
 a1 b1 c1 c1 a1 b1a2 b2 c2 b2 b2 c2
a3 b3 c3 a3 c3 a3


where e = (a1, b2, c3)
T and f = (b1, c2, a3)
T . Obviously, b ∈ desc({e, f}) holds since b3 ∈
{a3, c3}. This is a contradiction to the definition of a 2-FPC because of the assumption
b 6∈ {e, f}. It is also easy to check that none of the next 16 subcases satisfies the condition
that |B| = 3. Finally the remaining 2 subcases correspond to the forbidden configuration
in (2).
The proof is then completed. 
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